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Does a banks ownership matter for a rms performance (to which it is connected)? Especially,
in the event of a crisis? I study this question through the e¤ect of 2008-09 crisis to provide
evidence on a new channel which matters signicantly for a rms export performance bank
ownership. In particular, I nd: (a) rms connected to private and/or foreign banks earn around
7.739% less in terms of their export earnings during the crisis as compared to rmshaving
banking relationships with public-sector banks. This happened as the public-sector banks were
di¤erentially treated by the Central Bank of India during the crisis due to a clause in the Indian
Banking Act of 1969; (b) e¤ect is concentrated only on the intensive margin of trade; (c) drop in
exports is driven by rmsclient to big domestic-private banks and banks of US origin; (d) rms
not connected to public-sector banks also laid-o¤ workers (both managers and non-managers),
employed less capital and imported less raw materials. In addition, I also nd that rms with
lower average product of capital (than the median) received about 50% more loans from the
public-sector sources, suggesting a signicant reinforcement of ine¢ ciency in the Indian economy
due to misallocation of credit.
JEL classications: F14, F41, G21, G28
Keywords: Bank Ownership, 2008-09 Financial Crisis, Public-sector Banks, Private and/or
Foreign Banks, Exports
This paper has been previously circulated as Bank Ownership, Monetary Policy and Exports: Evidence from a Matched
Firm-Bank Dataset. The Central Bank of India is popularly known as the Reserve Bank of India or RBI. I have used
Central Bank of India and RBI interchangeably through the paper; both the names refer to the same institution. This
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ted from discussions with Reshad Ahsan, Richard Baldwin, Shantanu Banerjee, Sebastian Franco Bedoya,
Ohad Raveh, Raoul Minetti, Vasso Ioannidau, Parantap Basu, Abhiman Das, Kaushalendra Kishore, Simona Mateut, Sanket
Mohapatra, Arijit Mukherjee, Nikhil Patel, Magdalena Rola-Janicka, Pranav Singh, Maurizio Zanardi, Yuan Zi as well as
conference participants at Ljubljana Empirical Trade Conference (LETC) 2018; Midwest Macro Meetings, Fall 2018; Workshop
on Regional Vulnerabilities on South Asia, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo; Arnoldshain Seminar XVI, Bournemouth
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Ahmedabad; 50th Money-Macro-Finance Conference, LSE, 2019; ETSG 2019, University of Bern; Midwest Trade Meetings,
Fall 2019; 7th Bordeaux Workshop in International Economics and Finance and seminar participants at Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, University of Nottingham, and Lancaster University.




Does a banks ownership matter for a rms performance (to which it is connected)? Especially,
in the event of a crisis? The role of banks on economic activities has long been investigated by
policymakers and academics (Friedman and Schwarz, 1963; Bernanke, 1983). And, there is now
a sizeable body of evidence suggesting that bank health/credit/funding signicantly a¤ects rm
activities, such as exports (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Manova, 2013; Paravisini et el. 2014;
Buono and Formai, 2018), investment (Amiti and Weinstein, 2018), nancial performance (Iyer et
al., 2014; Ongena et al., 2015), etc. Another set of literature studies how di¤erential exposure to
international nancial shocks of di¤erent types of banks can act as a propagation mechanism during
global nancial crisis (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012; Schnabl,
2012; Acharya et al. 2013; Ivashina et al., 2015; Ongena et al., 2015). However, the e¤ect on rm
performance due to variation in banksownership pattern, especially during a crisis, has not been
studied in detail and the underlying mechanisms behind this e¤ect are still not well understood.1
In this article, I show evidence of a new channel which can matter signicantly for a rms
performance, in this case exports, especially in the event of a crisis  bank ownership. Indian
manufacturing rms connected to private (major) or foreign banks earned 7.739% less in terms
of their export earnings during the crisis as compared to rmshaving banking relationships with
public-sector banks. This happened as the public-sector banks were di¤erentially treated by the
Central Bank of India (popularly known as Reserve Bank of India or RBI ) during the crisis of
2008-09 due to a clause in the Indian Banking Act of 1969. And, this led to di¤erential perfor-
mance of rms connected to these respective banks. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst
paper to show how rms got di¤erentially a¤ected (in terms of their exports) due to their banking
relationships while using a clause in the Banking Act as the identication strategy.
A key question arises immediately: how does being client to a public-sector bank help a rm to
mitigate the partial e¤ects of the crisis? Existing set of research highlights two possible reason: (1)
credit-lending by public-sector or Govt.-owned banks tend to be less responsive to macroeconomic
shocks than private banks (Micco and Panizza, 2006; Bertray et al., 2012; Cull and Martinez-Peria,
2012; Acharya and Kulkarni, 2016). Panel A of Figure 1 reveals such similar situation in case of
1However, there is one recent study which is similar to this article: Coleman and Feler (2015). They utilize data from
Brazilian banks to show that bank ownership pattern signicantly matters for regional level economic performance, such as
GDP, employment, wages. My paper complements and extends the study by Coleman and Feler (2015) in terms of utilizing a
matched rm-bank dataset and causally estimating the e¤ect of the bank ownership using a policy change during the 2008-09
crisis on rm level export performance.
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India. For public-sector banks, credit expanded during the crisis of 2008-09 by 20.4% as compared
to 22.5% in 2007-08, a mere drop of 2 percentage points. On the other hand, for private banks
and foreign banks the numbers are 10.9% and 4%, respectively (compared to 19.9% and 28.5% in
2007-08, respectively).
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) points out that one of the reasons why public-sector banks cut
their credit less is that they may have better access to deposit nancing. Panel B of Figure 1
plots the growth in deposits in case of Indian public-sector, private and foreign banks. An average
public-sector bank saw an increase in deposits, whereas for the other two types, it declined sharply.
Deposits in the public-sector bank increased by 26.9% in 2008-09 as compared to 23.1% in the
previous year.2 On the other hand, private banks deposit growth decreased from 22.3% to a
meagre 9.1% for the same period. Acharya et al. (2019) utilizing branch level data from Indian
banks show there has been a reallocation of credit from private to public-sector banks. They argue
that this is a result of a panicchannel a depositors run on local branches although the banks
that held the deposits had no exposure to the fundamental crisis.
The di¤erential performance (between public-sector and other banks) could also be due to the
di¤erences in investor condence. Eichengreen and Gupta (2013) by analyzing change in bank
deposits in India during the crisis of 2008-09 shows that it is the expectation for an implicit and/or
explicit guarantee for the public-sector banks that resulted in a signicant growth in deposits during
the crisis. Acharya and Kulkarni (2016) also came to the same conclusion by comparing the credit
default swap (CDS)3 spreads for Indias largest public-sector bank (State Bank of India, SBI) and
largest private bank (ICICI). Both the spreads were within the same range in 2007-08, but the
di¤erence increased in SBIs favour during 2008-09 indicating that the market possibly views a
public-sector bank to be more resilient to a crisis than a private bank.
(2) due to political pressure. Dinc (2005) using cross-country bank level data provides evi-
dence about political inuences on these banks government-owned banks increase their lending in
election years relative to private banks. Using plant level data for Brazilian manufacturing rms,
Carvalho (2014) provides such similar evidence of political inuence over the real decisions of rms.
Firms connected with government banks expand employment in politically attractive regions be-
2The Govt. of India also issued a directive to public-sector enterprises (rms, not banks) to deposit their surplus funds
in public-sector banks (Economic Times, 2008). Following the fall of Lehman Brothers and subsequent credit crisis, many
depositors shifted capital out of private and foreign banks and moved to public-sector banks. Infosys, a software MNC,
transferred nearly INR 10 billion of deposits from ICICI (the biggest private bank in India) to SBI just after Lehmans collapse
in the 3rd quarter of 2008 (Economic Times, 2009).
3A CDS spread represents the cost of purchasing insurance against the default of an underlying activity.
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fore elections.4 However, political inuences may not be of much relevance in this case given the
following reasoning.
An additional reason, which is unique in my case and this helps to causally identify the e¤ect
of bank ownership on rm level exports is the presence of the Indian Bank Nationalization Act
1969. The Act provides an explicit guarantee that all obligations of the public-sector banks will be
fullled by the Indian Govt. in the event of a crisis. This Bank Nationalization Act was adopted
when 14 of Indian commercial banks were nationalized in 1969. The presence of this Act amplies
the intensity of the former reason and paves the way to exploit it in the event of a crisis, like that
of 2008-09. Acharya and Kulkarni (2016) shows that it is the explicit and implicit government
guarantees for the public-sector banks that helped them to tackle the nancial crisis better than
other banks.5
Figure 2 plots the normalized average real borrowings by a public-sector, private and foreign
bank from the Central Bank of India in a given year from 2004 to 2010. The plot clearly shows
that pattern of borrowing from the RBI is very similar before the crisis, but signicantly di¤erent
afterwards. The ow of money from the RBI increases almost exclusively for the public-sector
banks.6
Another question which may be relevant here (given the focus of the paper): why do I use ex-
ports as the outcome of interest? Firstly, linkages between nancial sector and rmsperformance,
especially export activities have attracted signicant attention in recent years (Berman and Heri-
court, 2010; Chor and Manova, 2011; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011, 2018; Minetti and Zhu, 2011;
Bricongne et al., 2012; Caggese and Cunat, 2012; Feenstra et al., 2014; Paravisini et al., 2014;
Manova et al., 2015; Muuls, 2015; Bronzini and DIgnazio, 2017; Buono and Formai, 2018).7 Sec-
ondly, during a crisis, the demand for liquidity by the exporters goes up signicantly as there could
be (a) payment for their sales gets delayed; (b) fall in demand for their products in crisis-ridden
4Similar evidences have been found by Cole (2009) in case of India, Khwaja and Mian (2006) for Pakistan, and Sapienza
(2004) for Italy.
5They also highlight that this is the theme worldwide. For example, the growth of the government-sponsored enterprises
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and commercial banks in the US (both set of institutions with explicit government support
and ready access to central bank emergency lending). These institutions expanded their holdings of mortgage-backed securities
while investment banks and hedge-funds de-leveraged and sold these type of securities (He et al., 2009).
6Mihaljek (2010) also provides similar evidence by looking across a range of emerging economies.
7To become an exporter, a rm is dependent on nancial resources for several reasons, such as identication of export
markets, making their products according to foreign demand, setting up distribution networks, etc (Baldwin and Krugman,
1989; Dixit, 1989). Manova (2013) points out that most of these costs are need to paid at the beginning and in addition they need
enough liquidity at hand in order to sustain for the relevant expenses after starting an export activity. For example, expanding
for a single market to multiple markets or increasing the volume of export ows. All these activities require substantial liquidity
(Chaney, 2016).
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countries; (c) the need to nd new destinations for their products; (d) inventories piling up; and (e)
a need to continue their production activities even with a drop in their sales. In these situations,
rms resort to banks for additional credit supply. If the banks are also simultaneously hit by the
crisis and fails to increase the lending, the real economy output falls.
Given this background, I use the context of nancial crisis of 2008-09 to investigate the di¤eren-
tial e¤ects of bank ownership on Indian manufacturing rmsexport activities. I presume that due
to pre-existence of the Bank Nationalization Act, the Central Bank of India di¤erentially treated
the public-sector and other banks (private and foreign) during the crisis and this subsequently got
reected in the performance of the rms, especially the exporters. I carry out the analysis at two
di¤erent levels:
(i) at rm-bank level. I exploit information on banking relationships of rms and banksbalance
sheet, specically borrowing by a bank from the Central Bank, to estimate the causal e¤ect of the
banksownership on rmsperformance. Using this matched rm-bank data helps me to tackle the
usual identication challenge that a lot of studies face to isolate changes in rm borrowing that
are driven solely by credit supply forces instead of credit demand. But, it still does not solve the
problem of selection issue the matching between rm and bank is endogenous.
For example, a rm may switch to a public-sector bank from its current banker (which could
be a private and/or foreign bank) during the crisis to avoid the anticipated drop in credit supply
or a rm may have multiple banking relationships, or it just stops borrowing from private and/or
foreign bank(s) and borrow only from public-sector bank(s), etc. Also, the lending pattern of banks
may vary according to their ownership. For example, foreign-owned banks may lend to completely
di¤erent set of rms. These issues can signicantly bias my estimated coe¢ cients.
To control for these, I undertake the following steps: (a) use an indicator variable which takes a
value 1 if a rm is a client to a public-sector bank in any random year before the crisis period8; (b)
use banksborrowing from the RBI (or total loans and advances) for years which are signicantly
before the crisis; (c) following Khwaja and Mian (2008) use a full set of rm xed e¤ects with
clustering of standard errors at the bank level to control for rm unobservables and multiple banking
relationships.9; and (d) interact rm xed e¤ects with the bank ownership dummy to control for
8 I also restrict the period to certain year(s) and the results remain the same.
9One other possible way to control for such issues is to construct a sample of rms with single banking relationship with
public-sector banks versus rms which have the same, but with private and/or foreign banks. However, in doing so, the sample
becomes very small and restrictive. In particular, a large proportion (i 90%) of the rms have to be dropped from the sample
and this will lead into some external validity problem. Nonetheless, use of pairwise rm-bank xed e¤ects along with clustering
at the same-level will help me purge out the right coe¢ cients.
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the fact that borrowing from the RBI by the banks might be correlated with unobservable borrower
characteristics that might a¤ect their credit demand.
(ii) at rm level. I use direct information on the sources of borrowing by the rms. For example,
how much a rm has borrowed from a public-sector bank, other domestic (private), and foreign
sources. I do this for the following reasons: rst, to create a nancial fragilityindex at the rm
level to check whether the demand side of the story matches the supply side. Second, to check
whether there is any substitution e¤ect in play (rms can possibly substitute credit across these
di¤erent types of banks); and nally to investigate for possible capital misallocation that may arise
due to the discretionary stimulus provided by the monetary policy.
For doing such kind of exercises, I put together information from a well-known dataset on Indian
manufacturing rms known as PROWESS (Goldberg et al., 2010; Chakraborty and Raveh, 2018).
The dataset is unique in a sense that (a) it reveals information on the name and type of banks that
each individual rm is client along with the information on the balance sheet of the banks, e.g., the
amount of borrowing done by the banks from the Central Bank of India or RBI, total amount of
loans and advances by them, etc.; and (b) it contains direct measures on borrowing by rms from
di¤erent types of sources, namely borrowings from domestic banks (public-sector), borrowings
from domestic private nancial institutions (private banks and Non-Bank Financial Companies,
NBFCs), borrowings from foreign banks, external commercial borrowings (ECBs), etc. The dataset
also reports trade ows, divided into exports and imports, total sales, compensation to employees,
expenditure on technology, capital employed, ownership category and other important rm and
industry characteristics. I use all this information for the time period 20002010. This enables me
to track a rms banking relationships over time, thereby allowing for a dynamic specication in
which changes in credit ows from di¤erent kinds of sources may inuence rm performance.
I have three di¤erent sets of results. First, I exploit banking relationships of the rms and balance
sheet of the banks (particularly, borrowing from the Central Bank of India or RBI) to show that
rms client to the private (especially, the big banks) and/or foreign banks (especially, the banks of
the US origin) earn less from exports as compared to rms connected to state-owned or public-sector
banks. My benchmark result is robust to all other possible important controls, such as demand
shock, di¤erential trends in bank lending, interactions between rm characteristics/xed e¤ects
and bank dummy, multiple banking relationships, substitutability of credit, matching methods,
etc. Interestingly, my conservative estimates show that the percentage drop in export ows for
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these rms (connected to domestic private and/or foreign) is close to what the macro gures of
Indias decline in export ows is during the 2008-09 crisis, which is 1617%. And, it is the small
and medium-sized rms exporting intermediate and capital goods who su¤ered the most.
Second, rms by virtue of not connected to the public-sector banks laid-o¤ workers (both pro-
duction and non-production; with the e¤ect for production workers about 40% higher), reduced
capital employed and import of intermediate inputs during the crisis. Lastly, I show evidence of
capital misallocation among rms as a result of the di¤erential treatment to banks (due to the
Indian Banking Act, 1969) during the crisis of 2008-09. Firms with lower (than the median) av-
erage product of capital, before the crisis, received about 50% more loans from the public-sector
sources than others. And, these rms are on average about 9% less productive than others. This
implies that this selective treatment to banks may have reinforced further allocative ine¢ ciency in
the economy. And, bank ownership played a crucial role in the process.
The ndings contribute to four di¤erent kinds of literature. My main/primary contribution is
to show that bank ownership matter for a rms performance, exports, especially in the event of a
crisis. In other words, the contribution lies in the identication and measurement of credit supply
shocks and their real e¤ects using matched rm-bank level data using the ownership of the banks
as the source of variation. My study is closely related to Coleman and Feler (2015) on Brazil. They
show that following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Brazils Govt.-owned
banks substantially increased lending. Localities in Brazil with a high share of public-sector banks
received more loans and experienced better employment outcomes in comparison to localities with
a low share of government banks. The results also indicate this lending was politically targeted
and ine¢ ciently allocated which reduced productivity growth.
In contrast, I show that the public-sector banks got more funding/loans from the Central Bank
because of a clause in the Banking Act of 1969. As a result of which lending from those banks
increased and this helped the rms (connected to those banks) mitigate the partial negative e¤ect
of the crisis. I also show that the discretionary nature led to an ine¢ cient allocation of capital
relatively more lending was given to rms which belong to the lower-half of the distribution of
average product of capital. To this end, I extend the literature to show that the interaction between
bank ownership and crisis help us understand the composition of the e¤ect on the real economy.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper to show that such evidence exists.
Secondly, my article is also closely related to the macro e¤ects of global banking (Klein et al.,
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2002; Chava and Purananandam, 2011; Clasessens et al., 2011). I add to this literature to show
that presence of private and/or foreign banks transmit international nancial shocks to an economy
and public-sector banks can act as counter-cyclical elements.
Third, the article also contributes to now a seemingly growing literature on trade and nance;
namely, the role of credit supply or shocks on export activities. This paper exploits a pre-existing
clause in the Banking Act which led to di¤erences in the availability of credit across di¤erent types
of banks due to their ownership patterns and measure its e¤ect on rmsexport performance. The
results are closely related to work that analyzes the e¤ects of credit disruptions on trade during the
Great Trade Collapse of 2008-09 (Bolton et al., 2011; Chor and Manova, 2012; Levchenko et al.,
2010) as well as the general literature on credit shocks or bankshealth and performance of rms
(Amiti and Weinstein, 2011, 2018; Bronzini and DIgnazio, 2015; Berton et al., 2018; Buono and
Formai, 2018).10 My results also show that stability or availability of external nance is indeed
important for exporters (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Lastly, the paper is also related to the recent literature that uses the bank lending channel as
an instrument for credit shocks (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010; Jimenez et al., 2012; Chodorow-Reich,
2014). I nd similar evidence, but, my results also show that it may depend on bank ownership
patterns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes what happened in India
during the crisis of 2008-09. The dataset is outlined in Section 3. Section 4 describes the empirical
strategies and the corresponding results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Financial Crisis in India during 2008-09
India, like Brazil and China was relatively immune to the slowdown of the international credit
ows.11 However, it still witnessed a heavy sell-o¤ by Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) during
the crisis to provide the much-needed liquidity to their parents in the US or Europe a net expulsion
of around $13.3 billion in 2008 through equity disinvestment (Joseph, 2009; Kumar et al., 2008).
10On the other hand, there is also a sizeable amount of studies showing how global nancial crisis of 2008-09 have impacted
trade ows (due to drop in demand or credit supply or rise in protectionism, etc.). The literature on Great Trade Collapse
(GTC) after the 2008-09 crisis identies 4 main channels: (i) decline in demand (Behrens et al., 2013; Eaton et al., 2016;
Chakraborty, 2018), (ii) drop in credit supply (Bricongne et al., 2012; Chor and Manova, 2012; Aisen et al., 2013, Parasivini et
al., 2014), (iii) rise in trade barriers (Kee et al., 2013); and (iv) imported inventories (Alessandria et al., 2010).
11Jayati Ghosh and C. P. Chandrasekhar in an article in The Hindu (Oct 21, 2008) argues that the global nancial crisis will
certainly have some impact in Indian case, but not of the kind that was experienced in the US due to well-regulated banking
system and strong fundamentalsof the economy. Rajan (2009) and Joseph (2009) also argues that the 2008-09 global nancial
crisis initially hit India via the nancial channel, but, not through the conventional route the subprime mortgage assets.
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Table 1 shows a major return ow of capital from India, especially in the second half of the year,
with regard to short-term trade nance and bank borrowings to the extent of US$ 9.5 billion and
US$ 11.4 billion, respectively.
This was followed by a massive slowdown in external commercial borrowing by Indias companies,
trade credit and banking inows. The drying up of funds in the foreign credit markets led to a
virtual cessation of external commercial borrowing for India, including access to short-term trade
nance. Indian banks lost access to funds from abroad, as inter-bank borrowing seized up in the
US and Europe and banks had to send funds to their branches abroad in those countries. This
led to (a) fall in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Index; (b) rapid depreciation of the Indian rupee
vis-a-vis the US dollar; (c) call money rate breaching the upper bound of the informal Liquidity
Adjustment Facility (LAF); overnight call money rates rose by nearly 20% in October and early
November 2008 (Figure A.1, Appendix A);12 and (d) decline in the outstanding amount of
certicate of deposit (CD) issued by the commercial banks as the global nancial market turmoil
intensies. All these happened despite the facts that majority of the Indian banking system is
owned by the public-sector (around 60%), and Indian banks have very limited direct exposure to
subprime mortgage assets (Sinha, 2010).13
The collapse of the stock market further ruled out the possibility of companies raising funds
from the domestic stock market. In addition, banks and corporates that were dependent on global
markets for foreign currency suddenly found themselves to be facing a major liquidity crisis as
credit dried up (Islam and Rajan, 2011). Thus, while the Indian banking sector remained largely
unscathed by the global nancial crisis, it still could not escape a liquidity crisis and a credit crunch.
However, this crisis a¤ected the banks in India di¤erentially.
Figure 3 plots the normalized total real loans and advances by di¤erent types of banks. Lending
pattern was similar before the crisis with signicant di¤erences arising after the crisis lending by
public-sector banks were signicantly higher than that of other types of banks. I presume that this
is due to the di¤erential treatment by the Central Bank of India towards the public-sector banks.
The RBI also requested the public-sector banks, that accounted for over 70% of loan growth in
2008-09, to reduce the Benchmark Prime Lending Rate (BPLR) and increase the credit ows to the
private commercial sector. Sengupta (2009) argues that the expansionary monetary policy which
12Sengupta (2009) points out that between mid-September to end-October 2008, the daily weighted average call rate and the
overnight weighted average money market rate (OWAR) exceeded the upper bound of the LAF corridor twice.
13 Indian banks are allowed to invest only 5% of their capital on sub-prime mortagage activities.
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was undertaken by the RBI as a result of the crisis of 2008-09 was specically targeted to increase
the lending to the state-owned banks. Figure A.2 (Appendix A) provides similar evidence in
case of Brazil.
Acharya and Kulkarni (2016) investigates the impact of ownership structure on bank vulnera-
bility in India and show that private banks performed worse than public-sector banks during the
2008-09 crisis. Private banks experienced deposit withdrawals, whereas state-owned banks saw
the opposite. Eichengreen and Gupta (2013) also shows that Indian private banks experienced a
slowdown in deposit growth during and after the crisis; public-sector banks, in contrast, did not ex-
perience any such similar situation. Both the studies conclude that one of the main reasons behind
this di¤erential e¤ect across banks is the explicit and implicit guarantee by the Govt. of India that
is attached to the public-sector banks, especially during the crisis. I use this as a pretext to show
that rms connected to these banks are di¤erentially a¤ected, in terms of their export performance,
using the explicit and implicit guarantee o¤ered by the Central Bank as a identication strategy.
3 Dataset
The sample of rms is drawn from the PROWESS database, constructed by the Centre for Mon-
itoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), a private agency. The database contains information on
approximately 27,400 publicly listed companies, all within the organized sector, of which almost
9000+ are in the manufacturing sector. I use data for around 5,500+ rms, for which there is
consolidated data on banking relationships. I use data for the years 2000 to 2010, hence covering
the crisis period (2008-09). Unlike other sources, the PROWESS data is in e¤ect a panel of rms,
enabling me to study their behaviour and banking relationships over time.
The dataset is classied according to 5-digit 2008 National Industrial Classication (NIC) level. I
re-classify it to 4-digit NIC 2004 to facilitate matching with other important industry-level variables;
hence, all the categorization made throughout the paper are based on the 2004 NIC classication.
The dataset spans across 108 (4-digit 2004 NIC) disaggregated manufacturing industries that belong
to 22 (2-digit 2004 NIC) larger ones. It presents several features that makes it particularly appealing
for the purposes of this study. Below, I outline two of the most important features that are primarily
needed for the paper.
(i) information on the banks of each rm. The dataset provides with the names and the types
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of banks (domestic public-sector, domestic private, foreign) for each and every rm.14 The dataset
provides information on 52 public-sector banks (including state-sponsored nancial institutions),
88 private banks (including cooperatives), and 53 foreign banks.15 This is according to the list of
major banks (excluding the state-sponsored nancial institutions, cooperatives)16 provided by the
RBI. The dataset also rolls out all the important information from the balance sheet of the banks.
In particular, there is information on borrowing done by these respective banks from the Central
Bank of India. This could possibly a direct result of the Bank Nationalization Act.17 This gives
me the unique advantage of utilizing this information for a bank, and see its impact on a rms
performance to which it is connected.
The balance sheet also gives information on the total amount of loans and advances given by
the banks. I use this variable as a robustness check to show that the e¤ects are similar. Lastly, the
dataset also provides information on the usual indicators which measure the health of a bank, such
as return on assets, operating prot to working fund ratio, etc. I use operating prots to working
funds ratio as a placebo to show that the bank ownership does not a¤ect rmsperformance through
health of banks. This is because: the primary purpose of the Act is to increase the lending to the
public-sector banks in the short-run and not per se to improve the health of a bank. Table 2
lists summary statistics for these variables at the aggregate and by the ownership of the banks.
A public-sector bank on average borrows more from the RBI and lends out more than a private
and/or a foreign bank. On other hand, foreign banks are more healthy than that of a public-sector
and/or private bank.
However, inspite of all these advantages there are a couple of potential limitations of the dataset
(in terms of the banking information) that is worthy of mention: (a) there is no way to understand
which bank is the main reference bank for a rm. Therefore, I treat all the banks with equal
importance; and (b) the dataset does not give the exact amount of loan that has been received by
a rm from a particular bank. I believe this is not of such a great concern in my case, as I plan to
utilize banksborrowing from the RBI (and total loans and advances by a bank) in order to test
14Table 15 (Appendix C) provide the descriptives of the number and type of banking relationship(s) for an average Indian
manufacturing rm. A listed Indian manufacturing rm on average has credit relationships with 5 banks. A public-sector rm is
client to about 7 banks, whereas a private and foreign rm is client to 5. Bigger rms on average have more banking relationships
than smaller ones. Same goes for exporters; an average exporter is client to twice the number of banks in comparison to a
non-exporter.
15Additionally, it gives information on about 9000 private NBFCs, 250 public-sector NBFCs, 173 foreign NBFCs, and 80
other small co-operative banks.
16My analysis includes the state-sponsored nancial institutions and co-operatives from the PROWESS dataset. Excluding
them also produces the same result.
17Figure 2 show such is the case; public-sector banks were able to borrow more money as compared to other banks.
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for the mechanism through which ownership a¤ects exports.
(ii) details about a rms sources of borrowing. It gives detailed information on di¤erent types of
borrowings (from banks and/or private nancial institutions) by sources (domestic or foreign) done
by rms. For example, borrowing from public-sector banks (domestic), borrowings from domestic
private nancial institutions. However, it does not di¤erentiate between a private bank or NBFC.18
It also gives information on the amount of loan taken in a currency other than Indian rupees, termed
as foreign currency borrowing. The foreign currency borrowing is further divided into whether it is
borrowed from banks (examples of such borrowings would be like loans taken from foreign banks,
foreign currency loans taken from foreign branches of Indian banks, foreign currency loans from
Indian banks, etc.) or other types of nancial institutions (includes credit from o¢ cial export
credit agencies and commercial borrowings from the private sector window of multilateral nancial
institutions such as International Finance Corporation (Washington), ADB, CDC, etc.). Table 3
calculates the average real credit borrowing (deated by wholesale price index) by all rms (across
the manufacturing sector) from di¤erent sources, public-sector banks, domestic private nancial
institutions (banks and NBFCs) and foreign borrowing for the years 2006-2009. It clearly shows
that it is only in case of the public-sector banks that borrowing increased after the crisis, while for
others it dropped.
Figure 4 plots the average borrowing done by a Indian manufacturing rm (for all rms and
further dividing it onto exporters and non-exporters) from four di¤erent sources - public-sector
banks, domestic private banks, foreign banks, and foreign NBFCs.19 Panel A of Figure 4 plots
the total borrowings for an average Indian manufacturing rm from a public-sector bank as opposed
to all other types of nancial institutions and banks (domestic private banks, foreign banks, and
foreign non-banking nancial corporations). The gure clearly highlights the di¤erential pattern
in borrowing rm borrowings from all but public-sector banks dropped signicantly in the post-
2008 period. And, this is particularly true in case of exporters as shown by Panel B of Figure 4.
On the other hand, Panel C of Figure 4 which documents the borrowing pattern of an average
non-exporting rm do not show any such pattern like that of an exporter.
18The borrowings from the domestic sources are further divided into secured and non-secured borrowing. When a rm
borrows money from a bank (public-sector or private) and provides them security in form of some claim over assets in the event
of a default, then such borrowings are termed as secured bank borrowings. A company may borrow loans from a single bank or
a number of banks or from a syndication of banks; all of these are a part of secured bank borrowings. I use secured borrowings
for the analysis. Putting both secured and unsecured borrowings also yields same result.
19Unlike the data on bank level borrowings, where I could di¤erentiate between a public-sector and domestic private bank, the
rm level borrowing data does not allow me to seggregate the private sources into private banks and other NBFCs. Nonetheless,
it still gives a clear idea on the di¤erential aspects of rm borrowing between public-sector, private-sector and foreign sources.
12
Lastly, one more concern which should be addressed here before proceeding to my main esti-
mations in the next section: how representative is the sample of rms of the total manufacturing
sector export margins? To understand, I calculate a simple proportion of total exports of all the
manufacturing rms in PROWESS to all Indian merchandise exports; the ratio ranges from around
55-60% (depending on the year). In terms of the number of exporters in my sample, it is about
one-third of the sample of manufacturing rms analyzed. This seems to be a fairly reasonably
picture in terms of the coverage of the exporting manufacturing rms by PROWESS. In terms of
export ows, coke, rened petroleum and nuclear fuel sector have the highest exports followed by
tobacco products, food products, textiles and beverages.20
In addition to this, the dataset rolls out information on a vast array of rm level characteristics
regarding to the total sales, imports, cost, compensation (wages plus incentives), production factors
employed, other kinds of expenditures, gross value added, assets and other important rm and
industry characteristics. Majority of the rms in the data set are either private Indian rms or
a¢ liated to some private business groups, whereas a small percentage of rms are either government
or foreign-owned. The database covers large companies, rms listed on the major stock exchanges
and many small enterprises. Data for big companies are worked out from balance sheets while
CMIE periodically surveys smaller companies for their data. The variables are measured in Indian
Rupees (INR) million, deated to 2005 using the industry-specic Wholesale Price Index. The
dataset accounts for more than 70% of the economic activity in the organized industrial sector, and
75% (95%) of corporate (excise duty) taxes collected by the Indian Government (Goldberg et al.,
2010).
CMIE uses an internal product classication that is based on the HS (Harmonized System)
and NIC schedules. There are total of 1,886 products linked to 108 four-digit NIC industries
spanning the industrial composition of the Indian economy. The US manufacturing data contain
approximately 1,500 products as dened by the Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) codes;
20Figure A.3 compares average real exports, divided into four di¤erent size quartiles, across all manufacturing sectors. The
decline in export earnings was 23.8% for 1st quartile, 24.3% for 2nd quartile, 17% for 3rd quartile and 1.1% for 4th quartile
of rms, respectively. On average, the drop in manufacturing export ows is 16.55% at the rm level (same as the overall
economy). Overall, these diagrams indicate that the export growth computed from our sample of rms follows the macro-level
Indian exports quite closely. Figure A.4 shows Indias total merchandise export ows along with other major destinations,
E.U., U.S. and Asia, for the years 2006-2009. In this gure, I plot the aggregate export data from the UN-COMTRADE. As
the gure shows, the growth rate of total manufacturing exports of India declined by around 17% for the year 2009, which is
almost the same as the drop in global trade during the crisis period. Exports towards major destinationssuch as E.U., U.S.
and Asiaalso declined during 2009, with the drop for Asia being the least. The drop in exports in 2009 is highest for the
U.S. (10.65%), followed by the E.U. (7.39%) and Asia (1.31%). The RBIs report (2009) on trade balance also suggests that
the export sector is hit quite badly, since a large proportion (nearly 40%) of Indian merchandise exports goes to the OECD
countries.
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therefore, the denition of product in this case is slightly more detailed. Around 20% of the rms
in the data set belong to the chemical industries followed by food products and beverages (12.81%),
textiles (10.81%) and basic metals (10.46%). Table 16 (Appendix C) presents summary statistics
at the rm level according to their banking relationships. The numbers show that the largest
exporter is connected to all the three types of banks. On the other hand, rms with highest
domestic sales are connected to only domestic banks (public-sector and private). Firms connected
to foreign banks have signicantly higher median sales, exports, domestic sales and assets.
4 Bank Ownership and FirmsExport
4.1 Firm-Bank level Regressions: Utilizing Banking Relationships
Empirical Strategy This section investigates the direct role of bank ownership on a rms per-
formance. In particular, I study this e¤ect through the use of the crisis of 2008-09 to estimate
the di¤erential e¤ect of the banking ownership on rmsexport ows. I start by exploiting the
rm-bank relations. I follow Coleman and Feler (2015) and use a simple interaction term between
a crisis dummy (Dcrisis) and a dummy indicating whether a rm is a client to a public-sector bank
or not as my variable of interest. I use the following simple OLS reduced form equation:
xijt = 1(Dcrisis  PSBfb;<2008) + bankcontrolst 1 + jt + i + it (1)
xijt is either the intensive or extensive margin of trade for an Indian manufacturing rm i
belonging to industry j at time t. Dcrisis is an indicator of the nancial crisis. It takes value 1 if
the year  2008. Now, given the Bank Nationalization Act 1969, which would explicity take care
of the public-sector banks, lending from the Central Bank can be assumed to be disproportionately
higher for the public-sector banks as shown in Figure 2. And, rms connected to those banks may
be di¤erentially a¤ected than others.
PSBfb;<2008 takes a value 1 if a rm (f) is a client to a public-sector bank (b). However, banking
relationships are endogenous. Firms can switch to a public-sector bank, especially during the crisis
to avoid the risk associated with a private and/or foreign bank. So, PSBfb;<2008 takes a value 1
if a rm is client to a public-sector bank in any year before the crisis.21 Therefore, the interaction
21 I check for the robustness of the results by xing the year of the relationship of a rm with the bank; the results turn out
to the same. Specically, I choose if a rm is client to a public-sector bank in 1999-00. In this case, PSBfb;<2008 takes a value
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term, DcrisisPSBfb;<2008, measures the impact of bank ownership given that there is a di¤erential
treatment during the crisis as a result of the specic explicit guarantee clause in the Indian Banking
Act. In other words, 1 measures the relative di¤erence between rmsexport performance when
it is connected to a public-sector bank vs. a private and/or foreign bank. A key assumption for my
identication strategy to be valid is that the cross-sectional di¤erences in aggregate lending by the
Central Bank of India (to the banks) are driven by di¤erential guarantee provided by the Banking
Act due to their ownership patterns, but uncorrelated with unobserved rm characteristics that
can a¤ect credit demand and exports during the same period. My coe¢ cient of interest is 1; I
expect 1 > 0. Firms having relationship with public-sector bank(s) are expected to have higher
gains from trade than rms connected with private and/or foreign rms. A negative 1 would say
the opposite.
It is true that the relationship between a rm and a bank even before the years of the crisis
is not random. There are several reasons why a bank(s) choose a rm(s) to provide credit. For
example, size of a rm. But, my goal here is to control for the fact that the relationship (between
a rm and a bank) is not inuenced due to the crisis. The matching can happen for any other
reason(s) than the crisis. However, I control for all the other possible reasons of the matching and
the benchmark result remains the same. I explain this in detail later.
Another important issue which can possibly bias my estimates from above equation is the issue
of multiple banking relationships of rms. As the summary statistics show, the mean and median
number of banking relationships of an Indian manufacturing rm is 5 and 4, respectively. Therefore,
restricting the dataset to rms only having single banking relationship forces me to drop around
95% of the observations leading to a potential loss in external validity. Therefore, to control for
the multiple banking relationships of the rms, I use rm xed e¤ects, i, along with clustering
of standard errors at the bank level. Ongena et al. (2015) argues that rm level xed e¤ects can
only be used when rms have multiple banking relationships. Presence of rm xed e¤ects will
also control for unobservable rm characteristics that might inuence a bank to choose a rm as
its client. Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jimenez et al. (2014) point out that once the rm level
xed e¤ects are controlled for, the key rm level characteristics that inuence the loan demand has
only a minor impact on the estimated coe¢ cients. I also explicitly interact rm xed e¤ects with
bank level characteristics to control for such issues.
1 if the year is only 1999-00. Since I use only the year 1999-00 as the representative year, I loose a lot of observations, but the
results are still the same. I also experimented with years before 2006, but the results continue to be the same.
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Additionally, I use interaction of industry xed e¤ects at the most disaggregated level (4-digit)
and year xed e¤ects, jt, to control for other simultaneous factors that may a¤ect the export ows
of a rm, such as any scal policy considerations, drop in demand for products due to the crisis22,
industry exposure of banks, etc. For example, some banks can choose to give credit only to certain
set of industries. bankcontrols contain age, age squared and size of a bank. I use total assets of a
bank in real terms at (t  1) period as its size indicator.
However, one should still be careful in interpreting the basic estimates as conclusive evidence
of the causal e¤ect of the banking ownership on the export patterns between rms connected
to public-sector banks and not because of the following couple of reasons: (a) omitted variable
bias; and (b) di¤erential time trends. We address the former by sequentially adding various other
observable and unobservable characteristics and its interaction with the PSBfb;<2008 dummy to my
baseline specication. As for the latter one, I show that the two groups of rms (rms connected
to public-sector banks and which are not) are not on di¤erent time trends in the pre-crisis period
through some checks explicitly in the following section.
Were the Firms with Di¤erent Banking Relationships (Public-sector and No Public-sector)
on Di¤erent Pre-Crisis Time Trends? Before proceeding to the main estimations, one needs to
address an important issue which is crucial for understanding the results: whether rms connected
to public-sector banks and not were on di¤erent trends before the crisis? In other words, are there
any signicant di¤erences in export patterns for these two sets of rms (according to their banking
relationships) which just got amplied as a result of the crisis? In order to understand whether
such is the case or not, we use pre-crisis data from 2000 to 2007 to estimate di¤erential time trends
in outcomes (both intensive and extensive margin of exports) for rms connected to public-sector
banks and not. Results are reported in Table 4. First, I estimate a constant linear time trend
model while allowing for an interaction of the constant linear trend with the PSBfb;<2008 dummy.
Second, we estimate a model where we replace the linear time trend with a series of year dummies
(for the pre-crisis period) and include in the regression of each of these time dummies with the
PSBfb;<2008.
Columns (1) (3) use natural logarithm of export earnings by a rm, whereas columns (4) 
(6) use exporter (a dummy variable) as the dependent variable, respectively. The estimates from
22 I also explicitly control for demand shocks.
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columns (1) (2) and (4) (5) suggest that there is a time trend in the export pattern, but this
trend is identical for rms connected to public-sector rms and not. The estimated coe¢ cient on
the interaction of the time trend and year dummies with the PSBfb;<2008 dummy is practically
zero in all the cases. It should also be noted that some of the interaction terms in columns (2) and
(4) are positive and others are negative, thereby lacking any consistent pattern. I, therefore cannot
reject the hypothesis that all the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. I conclude that both
groups of rms were on a similar time trend in terms of their export patterns in the years prior to
the crisis.
Next, in columns (3) and (6), I run a placebo test with detailed estimates of the timing of
changes in both margins of trade. I follow Branstetter et al. (2006) and adopt the following
methodology. I use an ex-ante ex-post approach to prove that there were no anticipatory e¤ects in
terms of the utilization of this specic clause in the Banking Act for rms connected to public-sector
banks. It could be possible that some of the rms connected to public-sector banks were getting
more loans as compared to rms connected to other banks prior to the crisis and this could have
created a di¤erence in the export earnings before the crisis and post-2008 di¤erence was just a mere
continuation. I argue that this is not the case.
The Dcrisis 2 dummy is equal to one for all years that predate the crisis of 2008 by two or
more years and is equal to zero in other years. Dcrisis 1 is a dummy which is equal to one for the
year preceding the crisis. On the other hand, Dcrisis+1and Dcrisis+2are two dummies which
are equal to 1 for the years 2009 and 2010, respectively. There is no dummy for the year for the
year of the crisis, i.e., 2008. All the other coe¢ cients provide estimates relative to that year. The
result indicates that the coe¢ cients on the dummies for the years prior to the crisis fails to show
any evidence of a signicant di¤erential pattern in exports prior to the crisis for rms connected to
the Govt.-owned banks and not. For example, the coe¢ cient on the Dcrisis 2 show that the export
earnings of a rm connected to a public-sector bank is no di¤erent than a rm not connected to
a public-sector bank relative to the year of the crisis. On the other hand, the coe¢ cients of the
interaction terms of Dcrisis+1, Dcrisis+2 and PSBfb;<2008 are positive and signicant. This implies
that there is a di¤erence in the export earnings between the rms connected to public-sector banks
and not after the crisis. In other words, rms connected to public-sector banks earn more from
their exports in comparison to rms connected to other types of banks.
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Results Having established that I am not comparing two completely di¤erent set of rms, I now
turn to the results of my benchmark estimations. Estimates are reported in Table 5. Columns
(1)  (4) regress rm level export ows or the intensive margin of trade on the interaction term
Dcrisis  PSBfb;<2008 controlling for rm xed e¤ects, interaction between bank xed e¤ects and
year trends23 with interactions between industry xed e¤ects (5-digit) and year trend in column (1),
interactions between industry xed e¤ects (2-digit) and year xed e¤ects in column (2), interactions
between industry xed e¤ects (3-digit) and year xed e¤ects in column (3), and interactions between
industry xed e¤ects (4-digit) and year xed e¤ects in column (4). My di¤-in-di¤ estimates show
that the di¤erences between export sales of a rm connected to a public-sector bank as compared
to other types of banks is positive and signicant. A rm connected to a public-sector bank earned
about 8% more from export sales as compared to a rm connected to private and/or foreign bank.
One important issue which needs to be addressed immediately is the fact that the borrowing
pattern of di¤erent types of banks might be di¤erent in the pre-crisis period. In other words, there
might be pre-trends which can possibly inuence the results. In order to control for such an issue,
I interact the year xed e¤ects with the public-sector bank dummy, PSBfb;<2008 in column (6).
My estimate remains signicant and stable. Figure 5 plot the coe¢ cients (1 s) for the years
2004-2010.24
The plotted coe¢ cients illustrate that the di¤erence between the rms connected to public-sector
banks and not in terms of export earnings is not signicantly di¤erent from zero before the crisis
of 2008. In other words, the export earnings rises di¤erentially for rms connected to public-sector
banks on and after 2008. In particular, it took a sharp rise in the year following the year of the
crisis and continued to be signicantly di¤erent from zero. However, one might argue that there is
a bumpin the year preceding the crisis i.e., 2007, but the estimate still remains indistinguishable
from zero; it only starts to signicantly di¤erent from zero from the year 2008. This is also shown in
my exercises in Table 4 the interactions between the year trends before 2008 with PSBfb;<2008
does not produce any signicant estimates suggesting that there is no categorical di¤erence between
the rms connected to public-sector banks and not in terms of export earnings.
Column (6) focuses only on sectors which are highly dependent on external nance. I use total
23The interactions between bank xed e¤ects and year trends will additionally control for any unobservable characteristics
which may drive the export patterns of the rms.
24 I have used 2008 as the reference period when plotting the coe¢ cients. The results or the gure is unaltered with the
change in the reference period. For example, if I set the coe¢ cient to 0 just before the crisis (in 2007), the result does not
change qualitatively.
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borrowing by a rm as an indicator for dependent on external nance. An industrial sector which
borrows more than the median borrowing of the entire manufacturing sector is classied as sectors
which are highly dependent on external nance. However, I do not nd any signicantly di¤erent
e¤ect for rms belonging to high-nancially dependent sectors.
Next, I use extensive margin of trade as the outcome of interest in columns (7) and (8). I do
not nd any e¤ect of the interaction between bank ownership and crisis dummy on the extensive
margin of trade. Current research on 200809 crisis show us that changes in trade margins due to
the crisis of 2008-09 is explained by intensive margin rather than extensive margin (Levchenko et
al., 2010). I also happen to nd the same.25
Table 6 presents a series of robustness checks of my benchmark ndings. I start by using
matching methods in Column (1). I compare rms using the characteristics (size, age) of their
respective banks and their corresponding industry and report the di¤erences in their export earn-
ings. Altering the estimation method does very little to my benchmark estimate; it continues to
be positive and signicant. Even though I control for rm xed e¤ects, my estimates could still
be a¤ected due to the following problem: foreign banks or private banks that rely on international
funding may lend to di¤erent types of rms in which case measuring the true impact of the shock
on the real economy may require accounting for rm fundamentals. In other words, the variation
in credit lending across these three types of banks can be driven by demand. To control for such
issues, I interact one key rm characteristic (measured through rm sales) with PSBfb;<2008, and
rm xed e¤ects with PSBfb;<2008 in columns (2) and (3), respectively. The coe¢ cient of interest
continues to remain positive and signicant.
The Khwaja-Mian (2008) approach that my estimates rely on is based on the assumption that
credit from di¤erent banks are perfectly substitutable. And, as a result of demand shocks, in
25As credit is an equilibrium outcome, outcomes from the supply side should match that of demand side. To check whether
such is the case, I now utilize another unique feature of the dataset to exploit information on rm level credit borrowing from
di¤erent sources. Results are reported in Table 16 (Appendix C). Borrowing is endogenous to the performance of a rm.
For example, a rm experiencing a sudden decrease in demand for its goods (as it may happen during the crisis) may want
to borrow more in order to keep the production going since the payment from the sale of goods are either low or would be
late. And, this may possibly increase the demand for credit. This type of events can establish a positive correlation between
borrowing from domestic sources and exports, but not a causal one. To potentially suppress these problems, I construct a
Financial Fragility index using borrowing pattern of the rms in the pre-crisis period. The main variable of interest is the
interaction term, Dcrisis  Borri;PSB;00 01. It estimates the di¤erence in the e¤ect on a rms export ows when a rm is
borrowing is from public-sector banks as opposed to foreign banks. Columns (1) (2) use natural logarithm of exports as the
dependent variable. Column (1) considers the case when a rm is borrowing from public-sector banks, whereas column (2) does
the same but only in case of rms belonging to industries of high nancial dependence. I nd signicant evidence on rms
having higher export earnings when borrowing from public-sector banks than foreign sources. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the
same exercise, but changing the dependent variable to extensive margin of trade. I continue to nd no evidence even when
looking at the demand side of the credit information for rms.
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expectation, credit taken from all banks are a¤ected proportionally. Now, one might possibly argue
that demand shocks no longer a¤ect banks proportionally. Suppose rms use private banks to fund
for export activity and the public-sector banks to fund working capital. If the demand for exports
drops, then will so the demand for credit from private banks. In order to control for such issues, I
use rm-bank xed e¤ects interacted with year trends with clustering at rm-bank level in column
(4). My estimate continues to be stable and close to my benchmark nding.
As highlighted before, the Khwaja-Mian (2008) approach also controls for the multiple banking
relationships by clustering at the bank level and dropping rms with multiple banking relationships
from my dataset will lead to violation of external validity theorem as I need to give away around
95% of my observations. However, to somehow get around this issue I use rms which have banking
relationships with one type of bank in column (5). For example, in my restricted sample rms have
multiple banking relationships, but all the banks are of the public-sector type or domestic private
or foreign. Using this sample helps me to overcome the external validity problem by a signicant
margin; my restricted sample is now about 25% of my total observations. The DcrisisPSBfb;<2008
term remains qualitatively the same, but di¤erent quantitatively; the point estimate drops a little.
Lastly, I control for export demand in column (6). The global nancial crisis led to a huge drop
in the demand for trade. According to the estimates of WTO (2010) and the World Bank (2010)
the real global output declined by 2.2%, whereas the real global trade had the same fate, but by
more than ve times of the global output. The collapse in global trade by over 17% between the
second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 is one of the most dramatic features of the
recent Great Recession.And, it could be possible that rms connected to public-sector banks
were less exposed to trade before the crisis than the borrowers of the domestic private and foreign
banks. This would mean that the results then will only reect the di¤erences in the unobservable
demand for exports across rms, rather than the causal e¤ect of the di¤erences in bank behaviour.
Unfortunately, my current rm level dataset does not provide rm-specic trade destinations.
To overcome this limitation, I complement my rm level dataset with destination-specic product-
level trade ows from INDIA TRADES in order to utilize the variation across destinations. INDIA
TRADES provides data for trade ows at the most disaggregated level, HS six digit level. I match
the product level data, belonging to respective industries, using a National Industrial Classication
(NIC) concordance code with the rms of those sectors at 4-digit level (which is my rm level
dataset). For example, the export ows of shirt are matched with a rm belonging to textile
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sector (2004 NIC 17). The main purpose of matching these two data sets is to create a measure of
demand shock, which varies according to industrytimecountry.
It is dened as the share of exports of an industrial sector or product category directed towards
countries a¤ected by the crisis (the US and/or the EU) to the total exports of that sector. For
example, lets consider the Textiles sector. The demand shockindex for the Textiles sector, say
for the U.S., would be total amount of textile exports to the U.S., relative to the total exports of




= exports to destination d(=US orEU) at time t for product jexports to the world at time t for product j
This proportion would give us an idea about the extent of demand prevailing for any product
categories in a crisis-a¤ected zone. In other words, this measure would tell me how much a certain
product is exposed to a crisis-a¤ected zone relative to the total demand for that product. A primary
concern with this demand shockindex is the potential endogeneity or problem of reverse causality.
There is a certain probability that the contemporaneous drop in total exports of a rm (for a certain
product category) due to some other reasons say, increase in transportation cost at the same time
(which is nothing to do with the crisis) may also inuence the drop in the export ows rather than
an actual drop in demand for that product in the crisis-a¤ected zone. To avoid that such factors
do not play a role in the estimations, I compute an average of the demand shockindex using data
for the pre-crisis years, 2000 and 2001 to create a potentially more clear and exogenous measure of






= Avg( exports to destination d(=US orEU) at 1999 and 2000 for product jexports to the world at 1999 and 2000 for product j )
This is arguably a more exogenous measure and will potentially subvert some of the problems
relating to the issue of reverse causality and produce clear and true estimates of the e¤ect of the
demand shock related to the 200809 crisis. The demand shockindex now varies across industry
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j and destination d (not time t) and is interacted with the crisis dummyor Dcrisis (takes a value
1 for the years  2008) Dcrisis  demandshockdj . Finally, it should be worth mentioning here
that I assume changes in the demand shock(demandshockdj;1999 2000) reect average change in
aggregate demand conditions in the US and the EU. I report the results for demand shockin case
of the US; the results are qualitatively the same if I use EU instead or put US and EU together.
Demand shock has a negative and signicant e¤ect on the export ows of the Indian manufacturing
rms. But, the e¤ect on exports due to di¤erences in bank ownership continues to be una¤ected;
it remains positive and signicant. This result highlights that overall e¤ect of the crisis on export
earnings is negative, and it is driven by the demand shock. But, the rms which were connected
to the public-sector banks were not adversely a¤ected due to the fall in the supply of nance. This
implies that the rms who were connected to other types of banks got adversely a¤ected both from
the demand shockand supply of nance (due to the ownership pattern of banks to which they
were connected).
4.2 Firm-Bank level Regressions: Utilizing Balance Sheets of Banks Testing
for the Mechanisms
Empirical Strategy Utilizing banking relationships is important to establish a causal e¤ect of the
bank ownership on rm level export ows, but it may not clearly address the following concern:
channel through which bank ownership a¤ects the real economy. In other words, whether it is the
di¤erential treatment by the RBI as a result of their ownership or is it the health of the banks
that led to this di¤erence in exports between types of rms (categorized according to their banking
relationships)?. The uniqueness of the dataset allows me to test for the channel by using direct
information on the amount of borrowings done by a bank from the RBI and health indicators for
a bank.26
Commercial banks, as a result of the crisis, will resort to the Central Bank. However, as a result
of the Bank Nationalization Act 1969, some banks, the public-sector ones will be able to borrow
more than the others. And, the rms attached to these banks may be di¤erentially a¤ected. I use
information on borrowing from the Central Bank (by the commercial banks) as a possible indicator
of this di¤erential treatment (by the Central Bank) during the crisis. To clearly understand whether
di¤erential borrowing by the banks a¤ected rmsperformance di¤erentially, I use the following
26As indicated previously, the dataset also provides information on the total amount of loans and advances done by a bank.
This is also a direct result of the kind of advances or help the commercial banks got from the Central Bank of India. I have
also used this for robustness check and results remain the same. More on this later.
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xed e¤ects type of OLS estimation to establish a cleaner causal e¤ect of the bank ownership:
xijt = 1(Dcrisis BCBb;<2008) + 2(Dcrisis BCBb;<2008  PSBfb;<2008) +
bankcontrolst 1 + jt + i + it (2)
BCBb;<2008 is the amount of borrowing done by a commercial bank b before 2008 from the Central
Bank of India (CB). Figure 2 suggests that there has been a di¤erential trend in the borrowing
from the Central Bank after the crisis for the public-sector banks, while the pre-trends was similar.
This is due to the implicit and explicit guarantee by the Govt. of India that it will especially take
care of the public-sector banks in the event of any crisis (Acharya and Kulkarni, 2016). However,
this type of guarantee can make the borrowing by the commercial banks from the Central Bank
during the crisis endogenous and therefore could overestimate the e¤ect of bank ownership on rm
level exports. In order to potentially subvert this problem, I use average of the borrowings by a
bank from the Central Bank of India during the years 2000 and 2001 as a proxy for the borrowing
of the years 2008, 2009 and 2010.
My main variable of interest is the double-interaction term, Dcrisis BCBb;<2008. It estimates the
e¤ect of borrowing by a bank (from the Central Bank) during the crisis on a rms exports given
that the rm is not connected to a public-sector bank(s), i.e., connected to other types of banks,
such as the private and/or foreign banks. In other words, it estimate the impact of bank ownership
on a rms exports when the bank is not publicly-owned. Therefore, I expect 1 < 0.
My other variable of interest is the triple interaction term Dcrisis  BCBb;<2008  PSBfb;<2008.
It estimates the e¤ect of the crisis of 2008-09 on a rms export ows when a rm banks with a
public-sector bank. Therefore, my other coe¢ cient of interest is 2 and I expect 2 to be non-
signicant. In addition to the interaction between industry and year xed e¤ects, jt, I also use
interaction between bank xed e¤ects and year trends to control for any bank unobservables that
may inuence rm level export margins.
Results Results are reported in Table 7. Column (1) estimates the e¤ect of the bank ownership
through the bank borrowing channel (from the Central Bank) controlling for rm xed e¤ects, year
xed e¤ects, interaction of bank xed e¤ects and industry xed e¤ects (5-digit) with a year trend.
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My estimates show that the rms not connected to public-sector banks experience a drop of about
16.6% in their exports sales as a result of crisis. Columns (2), (3) and (4) substitute interaction of
industry xed e¤ects with year trend with interaction of year xed e¤ects and industry xed e¤ects
at 2-digit, 3-digit and 4-digit level, respectively. The coe¢ cient on Dcrisis  BCBb;<2008 is negative,
robust and signicant. Column (5) replaces BCBb;<2008 with B
CB
b;00 07. In particular, I use the average
of the bank borrowings from the Central Bank for the years 2000 to 2007 to check whether there is
anything specic for the years 2000 and 2001 that is driving the result. I do not nd any support
for such conjecture.
Column (6) focuses on rms belonging to the high-nancially dependent sectors. The negative
e¤ect on the rms not connected to public-sector banks continues to be signicant, but not signif-
icantly di¤erent from the aggregate estimates. On average, a rm not connected to a public-sector
bank saw a reduction in its export ows or intensive margin of trade of about 8.216.7%. Interest-
ingly, the rm level estimates are very close to the overall drop in Indias export ows during the
crisis, which is around 16-17%. On the other hand, I nd no e¤ect on the rms connected to the
public-sector banks. I attribute this nding as an e¤ect of the disproportionate increase in the ow
of money to the public-sector banks from the Central Bank due to the explicit guarantee provided
during the crisis. This led to an increase in the credit supply to the rms which are connected to
those and it mitigated the e¤ect of the crisis through supply of nance channel. In other words,
the public-sector banks played a counter-cyclical role.
Columns (7) and (8) use the extensive margin of a rm as the dependent variable. Like before,
I nd no e¤ect on the exit probabilities of the exporters. Lastly, I use domestic sales in columns (9)
and (10) as the dependent variable to check any di¤erential e¤ect of bank ownership; column (9)
runs it for the exporting rms, whereas column (10) does it for non-exporters. The negative e¤ect
continues to be signicant only in case of exporters. But, the magnitude of the e¤ect is signicantly
less, 3.8%, when compared with exports.27
Next, in Table 9 I control for other possible e¤ects and issues that may a¤ect my estimates 
di¤erential trends of borrowing by the commercial banks from the Central Bank, di¤erent banks
lending to di¤erent types of rms, lending pattern of banks correlated with rm characteristics.
27 I also use total loans and advances by the banks (LAb;<2008) in place of borrowings from the Central Bank in Table 17
(Appendix C) as a robustness check. I nd similar negative e¤ects of not having a banking relationship with a public-sector
bank. A rm when not connected to a public-sector bank su¤ers a drop of around 1416% drop in their export ows. I continue
to nd no e¤ect on the extensive margin of a rm with similar e¤ect in case of domestic sales, i.e., the e¤ect is concentrated
only for exporters.
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DcrisisBCBb;<2008 continues to be signicant and negative suggesting stronger evidence that public-
sector banks can act as a counter-cyclical mechanism. My conservative estimates suggest that
the rms connected to a foreign and/or private banks register a drop of about 6.88.7% drop in
export sales as a result of the drop in credit supply during the crisis of 2008-09. And, the drop in
credit supply happened because of the ownership of the banks to which these rms are connected.
Columns (5) and (6) control for other bank health characteristics, such as operating prots to
working funds ratio and return to assets. My benchmark result does not change. I repeat the
specications of columns (2) (4) in columns (7) (9) but by replacing the dependent variable to
extensive margin of trade. I continue to nd no e¤ect of bank ownership on the extensive margin
of trade.28
Lastly, I use a protability ratio of the banks as a placebo to show that this e¤ect on export ows
is mainly due to this increase in short-term lending by the Central Bank (to the banks; mainly the
public-sector), which was the primary purpose of this clause in the Banking Act and per se not to
improve the nancial health of the banks (which is considered to be more of a long run objective).
I use operating prots to working funds ratio as an indicator for health of banks. Results are
reported in Table 9. I nd no e¤ect of the nancial health of the banks on either of the export
margins of trade and domestic sales.
Overall, by comparing credit received and/or provided by di¤erent banks with di¤erential expo-
sure to nancial shocks (where foreign banks have the most exposure and public-sector banks the
least), my estimates provide evidence that possible international exposure of the domestic private
banks may have acted as a propagation mechanism during the global nancial crisis (Cetorelli and
Goldberg, 2012) and foreign banks transmitted shocks across borders through their local a¢ liates
(Ongena et al., 2015). This exposure to foreign funding interacted with the discretionary approach
undertaken by the Central Bank of India during the crisis has had a signicant negative e¤ect on
the export ows of the rms connected to these type of banks. In other words, it is the dispropor-
tionate transfer from the Central Bank to the public-sector banks, after the crisis hit the Indian
capital market, which resulted in no adverse e¤ect for rms connected to those public-sector banks
(possibly due to drop in credit supply).
I now utilize further heterogeneity within these three types of banks to understand which rms
are more a¤ected than others according to more ner categories of banking relationships? For
28My results are same if I substitute Central Bank borrowing by banks with total loans and advances.
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example, does a rms export ows dropped more when a rm is connected to a US based bank
(such as, Bank of America) rather than a EU based bank (such as, Barclays)? or when a rm is
connected to the biggest private domestic bank, ICICI, as opposed to other small private banks?
4.2.1 Heterogeneity Across Banks
Foreign Banks I start by looking at rms which are connected solely to foreign banks. Results are
reported in Table 10. In other words, my treatment group is now all the domestic banks (putting
together public-sector banks and domestic private banks into one group) and the control group is
only the foreign banks in columns (1) and (2). My triple interaction term is now DcrisisBCBb;<2008 
DBfb;<2008. DBfb;<2008 takes a value 1 if a rm is a client to a domestic private bank and/or public-
sector bank before the crisis years. These estimations will help understand whether foreign banks
are one of the primary sources of the negative e¤ect on the export ows of the rms. My estimate
show that rms connected to the foreign banks su¤ered about 15.7% drop in export earnings as
compared to rms connected to domestic banks. On the other hand, I do not nd any e¤ect on the
rms connected to public-sector and/or private banks. This could be due to the following reasons:
(a) either the positive e¤ect of relationships with public-sector banks dominates over the negative
e¤ect of the private banks, or (b) the e¤ect of the crisis on the private banks is limited to only
a few, or (c) private banks did not su¤er the liquidity crisis. I still do not nd any e¤ect on the
extensive margin of trade.
Columns (3) (7) compare the foreign banks by dividing them according to their origin of the
parent bank. For example, Barclays Bankis categorized as a European bank, whereas Bank of
America is classied as a US based bank. Additionally, I also classify banks into Japan based
banks and Other banks (which combine banks from Canada, Middle East, Bangladesh, South
Africa, etc.). In these columns, I only compare rms connected to foreign banks (as the control
group) and public-sector banks (treated group), thereby leaving out the private banks from the
estimations.
The results show that the negative e¤ect on rmsexport ows due to relationship with the
foreign banks comes from the US based banks and banks from other regions and not the EU and
Japan based banks. Firms connected with the former types of banks register a 1721% drop in their
exports. The nancial crisis of 2008-09 originated in the US, therefore it is highly likely that the
e¤ect of the crisis on the US banks would be much higher than other foreign banks. Chakraborty
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(2018) also shows that during the crisis the exports of the Indian manufacturing rms are most
a¤ected (as a result of the drop in demand) when their trade destination is the US compared to
EU.
Private Banks My control group is now only the domestic private banks (I leave out foreign banks
from these estimations). That is, the double interaction term Dcrisis BCBb;<2008 now estimates the
e¤ect of the bank ownership only when a rm is connected to private bank(s) in columns (8) and
(9).
Ongena et al. (2015) show that rms in Eastern Europe are negatively a¤ected when they are
connected to domestic banks which rely on international funding. And, these are usually the major
private banks. I follow Ongena et al. (2015) and compare the e¤ects on exports when a rm in a
client to a public-sector bank versus all other private banks and major private banks in India. On
the other hand, Acharya and Kulkarni (2016) points out that three of the major private banks in
India (HDFC, ICICI and AXIS) su¤ered heavily during the crisis as they were dependent on foreign
sources of nance. In addition to these banks, I also include three other major private banks which
have a share of more than 5% of all relationships with rms in the sample IndusInd Bank, Kotak
Mahindra Bank, and Yes Bank.
The estimates show that while there is no e¤ect of the drop in credit supply on a rms export
ows when I use all private banks, but Dcrisis  BCBb;<2008 is signicantly negative when rms are
connected to the major private banks. Firms connected to the major private banks saw a drop of
about 10% in their export earnings.
4.3 Other E¤ects
Given the consistent evidence on signicant reduction in export ows for rms not connected
to public-sector banks, it is also imperative to investigate about what happened to the other
key characteristics of rms, namely the production factors and imports. Results are reported in
Table 11. Following Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Cong et al. (2019), I start by looking at labour
compensation. PROWESS is not suitable to understand the employment e¤ects, as the number
of employees data is not consistently reported both across rms and over time. But, the dataset
routinely reports data on the total price of labour and can further be divided into managerial and
non-managerial compensation. Therefore, I concentrate only on the intensive margin of employment
e¤ects. Columns (1)  (3) look at the e¤ects on total labour, managerial, and non-managerial
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compensation. Firms which experience a drop in their exports either laid-o¤ workers or paid less
wages as a result of the crisis; both managerial and non-managerial workers su¤ered. But, the
negative e¤ect of the crisis on the non-managerial or unskilled or production workers is about 40%
higher than that of managerial or skilled or production workers.
Column (4) substitutes labour by capital. I look at the amount of capital employed by a rm.
Firms connected to domestic private and/or foreign banks reduces the amount of capital employed
by rms by 15.5%. Next, in column (5) I use another important factor of production, raw material
expenditure. I do not nd any negative e¤ect on use of raw materials by rms not connected to
public-sector banks. Columns (6) (9) explore the e¤ects on di¤erent types of imports - capital
goods, raw materials, stores and spares, and nished goods. I nd signicant negative e¤ects only
in case of raw materials or intermediate inputs; rms reduced their import of raw materials by
around 16%.
These results portray two important implications: (a) banking relationships during the crisis
not only matter in case of exports, but imports and use of productive factors as well; and (b) credit
shortage may have reduced exports through drop in labour, capital, imported inputs.
4.4 Firm Characteristics
This section explores one important additional question: which type of rms were a¤ected? Table
12 slices the data according to di¤erent rm characteristics to investigate this question. I start
by dividing the rms by size. I categorize rms into four di¤erent quartiles. based on the average
assets before the crisis. A rm is classied in 1st quartile if the average assets of a rm for the
years 2000-2007 is less than 25th percentile of the assets of the corresponding industry; a rm is
in 2nd quartile if the average assets falls between 26th and 50th percentile of the assets of the
industry to which the rm belongs, and so on. Columns (1) (4) run the regressions for all the
four quartiles. Like Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Ongena et al. (2015), I also nd that it is the
small and medium rms, which are most a¤ected due to the crisis; in my case, as a result of not
having banking relationships with public-sector banks.
Next, I classify rms according to its end use product: consumer durable, intermediate, basic,
capital and consumer non-durable in columns (5) (9) to check for the compositional e¤ect. My
estimates show it is the rms exporting intermediate and capital goods, which have had the highest
drop in export ows; by 30% and 39%, respectively. My results are aligned with Levchenko et
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al. (2010) and Bems et al. (2010) who nd that large changes in demand for intermediates
signicantly explain the reductions in both imports and exports. Columns (10) and (11) divide the
rms according to their ownership: domestic and foreign. Both types of rms which are connected
to private and/or foreign banks during the crisis su¤ered a drop in their exports with the foreign
rms having the higher e¤ect; average drop in exports during the crisis for a domestic rm was
12.3% against 21.5% for a foreign rm. The negative e¤ect for a foreign rm was about 75% higher.
4.5 Credit Allocation
The objective of this section is to study how credit allocation was done across rms as a result
of the specic clause in the Banking Act of 1969. In other words, what kind/type of rms got
more loans from the public-sector banks? This is important to know, because if the rms that
were not a¤ected by the crisis due to their connection with the public-sector banks are on average
ine¢ cient than the rest, then this may reinforce additional ine¢ ciency in the economy through
capital misallocation. To investigate such a question, the ideal is to have a rm-specic loan level
data from their respective banks. As highlighted before PROWESS only gives information on total
loans and advances by a bank and not rm-specic loans.
However, we know that PROWESS gives data on rm borrowing from di¤erent sources as utilized
in Section 4.3. I exploit this particular dimension of the dataset to investigate credit allocation
across rms during the crisis years. To this end, I estimate the following equation:
ln(yit) = 1(Dcrisis HighAPKi;00 07) + firmcontrolst 1 + i + jt + it (3)
y is either total borrowing by rms or borrowing from public-sector sources or borrowing from
other (domestic private and foreign) sources. HighAPKi;00 07 takes a value 1 for rms which
has average product of capital (APK) greater than the median average product of capital for the
corresponding industry, but before the years of the crisis, i.e., between 2000 and 2007. APK is
dened as the log of value added divided by xed assets, and it is used as a proxy for marginal
product of capital.29 So, the estimated coe¢ cient will be a relative e¤ect. It will tell us how much
29 I have also used capital employed divided by total assets of a rm, and the results remain the same.
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amount of credit was given to rms who are above the median as opposed to those below the
median based on rm level APK in the pre-crisis period. 1 > 0 would imply rms with higher
average product of capital got more loans, whereas 1 < 0 would signify credit misallocation.
Results are reported in Table 13. Columns (1) and (2) use total borrowing by rms as the
outcome variable. The estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction between credit supply increase
and initial average product of capital is negative and statistically signicant. This indicates that
during the crisis rms with lower pre-crisis average product of capital got more loans than the
rest. Columns (3) and (4) substitute total borrowing by borrowing from public-sector sources
and columns (5) and (6) use borrowing from other sources as the dependent variable. My point
estimates show that the entire negative e¤ect on total borrowing is driven by borrowing from public-
sector banks and not any other sources. The estimated coe¢ cients remain negative but increases
signicantly. The magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient indicates that rms with a one-standard
deviation larger APK experienced a 50% lower increase in bank loans from public-sector sources
during the crisis period.
Figure 6 conrms this fact by comparing the productivity distributions of rms having banking
relationships with public-sector banks and no relationships with public-sector banks. I estimate
productivity using Levinshon and Petrin (2003) methodology. A representative rm having rela-
tionship with public-sector bank(s) is on average 9% less productive than a rm which is a client to
private and/or foreign banks. The productivity distribution of rms connected with public-sector
banks has a long right tail and higher spread than the other type of rms. Combining both these
results, I can possibly argue that because of the clause in the Banking Act it may have lead to signif-
icant reallocation of resources towards ine¢ cient rms and this can create some sort misallocation
within the economy in the future.
Raghuram Rajan in his 2013 Annual Andrew Crockett Memorial Lecture in Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) points out that the types of unconventional monetary policies undertaken
by the Central Bankers after the crisis of 2008-09 has truly been a step in the dark. This is
because these type of policies raise more questions than answers. The fundamental hope behind
these policies are that as the price of risk is reduced, rms faced with lower cost of capital will have
higher incentives to make real investments, thereby creating jobs and enhancing growth. He points
out that there are two reasons for which these calculations can possibly go wrong: (a) absence of
a well capitalized banking system or policy certainty, and (b) large reduction in the cost of capital
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for rms such that they prefer labour-saving capital investment to hiring labour. And, in case of
India, the former applies aptly.
5 Conclusion
In this article, I show bank ownership to be a new channel which matters signicantly for a rms
export ows, especially in the event of a crisis. A rm not connected to a public-sector bank during
the crisis su¤ers about 7.739% drop in their export ows than rms connected to public-sector
banks. This drop in export earnings is only signicant for small and medium rms or rms belong
to the lower-half of the size distribution who export intermediate and capital goods. Both domestic
and foreign rms are a¤ected during the crisis with the e¤ect being 75% higher in case of the later.
Second, the negative e¤ect of the drop in credit supply on rmsexports is driven by rms which
are connected to the major domestic-private banks and banks of US origin.
Third, the crisis of 2008-09 also led rms which are not connected to public-sector banks purge
excess labour (more for production workers), employed less capital and imported intermediate
inputs in their production. These results may also provide a partial explanation for job losses, if
the lack of credit caused rms to purge excess labour more than they otherwise would.
Lastly, I show that rms with lower average product of capital less than the median got 50%
more loans from the public-sector sources due to pre-existent clause in the banking Act. This may
infuse a certain level of ine¢ ciency in the economy through misallocation of credit. This can result
in low aggregate output per worker and TFP in the future. To this end, I can possibly argue that
the e¤ect of the ownership of banks appear to be economically important both at the micro level
(rm) and aggregate, but supposedly in opposite directions.
My ndings provide direct evidence for a new complementary channel which is bank ownership
that highlights the role of nancial frictions in restricting the availability of credit to rms (Chavaa
and Purnanandam, 2011; Coleman and Feler, 2015). Overall, my results suggest that the global
integration of the nancial sector can contribute to the propagation of nancial shocks from one
economy to another through the banking channel.
Interpreting the export performance of rms connected to public-sector banks a success is ques-
tionable as the relative stability and e¢ ciency of public-sector banks relative to private and/or
foreign banks appears doubtful. This is because there is no sign of superior stability or returns for
public-sector banks in the period following the crisis. In addition, the perception that public-sector
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banks enjoy an implicit guarantee is a moral hazard that may limit the incentive to enhance e¢ -
ciency and encourage excessive risk taking. This points to the desirability of scaling back implicit
guarantees to the public-sector banks and in general whether by preventing them from becoming
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Public-sector, Private and Foreign: 2008 and 2009
Credit and Deposits Growth in Banks in India
Figure 1: Credit and Deposits Growth in di¤erent types of banks in India, 2008 and 2009
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Borrowing from Central Bank of India
Figure 2: BanksBorrowing from Central Bank of India, 2004-2010
Notes: Figure represents average real borrowing from Central Bank of India by di¤erent types of banks in India (as
listed by the RBI). "Public-sector Banks" include all the state-owned banks. "Private Banks" are the domestic
private banks. It does not include private NBFCs and co-operative banks. "Foreign Banks" are banks of foreign
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Total Loans and Advances
Figure 3: Total Loans and Advances by Di¤erent Types of Banks, 2004-2010
Notes: Figure represents total real loans and advances by di¤erent types of banks in India (as listed by the RBI).
"Public-sector Banks" include all the state-owned banks. "Private Banks" are the domestic private banks. It does
not include private NBFCs and co-operative banks. "Foreign Banks" are banks of foreign origin. The loans and
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Indian Manufacturing Firms, 2006-2010
Firm-level Borrowing
Figure 4: Firm level Borrowing, Indian Manufacturing Firms, 2006-2010
Notes: Figures represent borrowing by an average manufacturing rm in India. Public-sector Banksrepresents all
the public-sector banks in India. Private-sector Banks includes borrowing from both private-sector and domestic
non-banking nancial institutions like SIDBI, HUDCO, NABARD, IFCI, SFCs, etc. Foreign Banks is borrowing
from foreign banks, foreign branches of Indian banks, Indian branches of foreign banks, foreign nancial institutions
(including foreign EXIM banks) and international development institutions, such as World Bank. Foreign NBFCs
represents the kind of borrowing, which is used in India to facilitate access to foreign money by Indian rms. It
includes commercial bank loans, supplierscredit, securitised instruments such as Floating Rate Notes and xed
rate bonds such as euro bonds or FCCBs or FCEBs etc. It also includes credit from o¢ cial export credit agencies
and commercial borrowings from the private-sector window of multilateral nancial institutions such as
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Figure 5: Impact of Bank Ownership on Exports, 2004-2010
Notes: Figure presents the response of the di¤erence in the export earnings for rms connected to public-sector












Indian Manufacturing Firms Connected to Different Banks
Productivity Distrbution
Firms with no connection to PSB Firms with connection to PSB
Figure 6: Productivity Distributions
Notes: Figure represents the productivity distribution of Indian manufacturing rms. Total Factor Productivity is
calculated using Levinshon and Petrin (2003).
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Foreign Direct Investment 15401 17496 13867 3629
Portfolio Investment 29556 -14034 -5521 -8513
External Commercial Borrowings 22633 8158 3157 5001
Short-term Trade Credit 17183 -5795 3689 -9484
Other Banking Capital 11578 -7687 3747 -11434
Other Flows 10554 4671 -1849 6520
Notes: Figures are in INR million. Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Bank Characteristics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Aggregate
Borrowings from RBI 6508.55 2900 9295.16 0 62690
Total Loans and Advances 813982.2 366267.8 1193674 2.8 6363053
Operating Prot/Working Funds 2.37 2.22 8.98 -1247 2089
Return on Assets 1.05 0.99 0.74 -21.45 9.64
Assets 1533651 729801.5 2101786 111 1.05e+07
Age 67.43 69 35.85 2 156
Panel B: Public-Sector Banks
Borrowings from RBI 8156.37 5045 10106.37 6.3 47200
Total Loans and Advances 1064770 530462.9 1372475 2.8 6363053
Operating Prot/Working Funds 2.04 2.05 6.15 -1247 17.08
Return on Assets 0.91 0.9 0.38 -6.5 3.67
Assets 2008089 946642.4 2401504 111 1.05e+07
Age 76.07 85 29.27 5 145
Panel C: Private Banks
Borrowings from RBI 2279.10 1000 3946.33 0 62690
Total Loans and Advances 487448.9 206576 612875.8 33.6 2324429
Operating Prot/Working Funds 2.46 2.42 15.80 -33 2089
Return on Assets 1.06 1.13 0.60 -3.57 3.16
Assets 880194.9 377997.5 1061077 403.6 4004171
Age 38.32 16 31.68 2 106
Panel C: Foreign Banks
Borrowings from RBI 4915.3 1380.9 8424.03 7.5 34200
Total Loans and Advances 140171.4 98118.1 128542.8 12.6 416271.5
Operating Prot/Working Funds 3.79 3.92 1.60 -21.45 17.36
Return on Assets 1.74 1.73 1.50 -21.45 9.64
Assets 319746.9 209097.4 310714.7 459.6 1052997
Age 76.62 76 45.47 4 156
Notes: Borrowings from RBIis the total amount of borrowings done by a bank from the Reserve or Central Bank
of India. Total Loans and Advancesis the total amount of loans and advances by a bank. Operating
Prot/Working Fundsis the ratio of operating prots to working funds of a bank. Return on Assetsis the return
on assets of a bank. It is a ratio. Assetsis the total assets of a bank. Ageis the age of a bank. Values are
expressed in INR Million.
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2006 0.3966 0.0520 0.0668
2007 0.4414 0.0457 0.0776
2008 0.5340 0.0469 0.0772
2009 0.6248 0.0326 0.0754
Notes: Values represent the average real credit (deated by the wholesale price index) by all rms (in the
manufacturing sector) from di¤erent sources in a particular year.
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Table 4: Di¤erences in Pre-Crisis Time Trends in Exports, 2001-2007: Firms Connected to Public-sector
Banks and Not Connected to Public-sector Banks
Ln(Exports) Exporter = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




















































Bank Controlst 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.82 0.82
N 51,195 51,195 51,195 51,195 51,195 51,195
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE (4-digit)*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Columns (1) - (3) use natural logarithm of exports of a rm as the dependent variable. Columns (4) (6)
use a dummy as the dependent variable which takes a value 1 if a rms export ows i 0. PSBfb;<2008is a
dummy variable representing a public-sector bank (PSB). It takes a value 1 if a rm is a client to public-sector bank
before the crisis. Time Trendis a linear time trend. Y ear20011, Y ear2002, Y ear2003, Y ear2004,
Y ear2005, Y ear2006, Y ear2007are year dummies. These dummies equal to 1 for the respective years. RR
is a dummy variable, which indicates monetary policy. Dcrisis 2is a dummy which is equal to 1 for all years that
predate the monetary policy by 2 or more years and is equal to 0 in all other years. Dcrisis 1is a dummy is equal
to 1 for the year 2007. Dcrisis+1and Dcrisis+2are two dummies which are equal to 1 for the years 2009 and
2010, respectively. There is no dummy for the year when monetary policy was undertaken, i.e., 2008. All the other
coe¢ cients provide estimates relative to that year. Bank Controlsincludes age, age squared and size of a bank. I
use total assets of a bank as the size indicator in (t  1) period and in real terms. Robust standard errors corrected
for clustering at the bank are in the parenthesis. Intercepts included but not reported. ,, denotes 10%, 5%





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I use an annual-based panel of Indian manufacturing rms that covers around 5,500+ rms with consolidated
data on banking relationships. This is across 108 4-digit industries for the years 199900 to 200910. Data
is based on the PROWESS database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). All monetary-
based variables measured in Millions of Indian Rupees (INR), deated by 2005 industry-specic Wholesale
Price Index (WPI). We use 2004 National Industrial Classication (NIC).
Variable denitions
Borrowings from Central Bank of India (Bank level): Banks borrow money from other banks as well as
from the Central Bank of India, popularly known as the Reserve Bank of India (or RBI). This is the amount
of borrowings done by a bank from the RBI. The RBI acts as a lender of last resort to Indian banks.
Therefore, banks cann borrow from the RBI on the basis of eligible securities or any other arrangement.
Also, in times of crisis, they can approach the RBI for nancial help.
Total Loans and Advances (Bank level): It is the sum total of all kinds of loans and advances made by
banks and nancial companies. It captures the outstanding value of total loans and advances of all types of
nancial companies.
Operating Prot/Working Funds (Bank level): It indicates the ratio of a banks operating prots to its
average working funds, expressed in percentage terms. Working funds refers to the total resources of a bank
as on a particular date. It can be construed as being either total liabilities or total assets. Total resources
would essentially include capital, reserves & surplus, deposits accepted from customers, borrowings, other
liabilities and provisions. It could also be looked at as total assets excluding accumulated losses, if any. It,
therefore, denotes a banks ability to put its resources to protable use, at the operating level.
Assets: Total assets of a rm and/or a bank.
Age: Age of a banks and/or a rm.
Dcrisis: Indicator of the 2008-09 crisis. It takes a value 1 for the years  2008.
Borri;PSB : Total borrowings by a rm i from a public-sector bank (PSB).
Exports (Firm level): Total exports of a rm.
Domestic Sales (Firm level): Total Sales - Exports of a rm.
Sales (Firm level): Total sales (exports + domestic sales) of a rm.
Imports (Firm level): Total imports = import of (raw materials + nished goods + stores & spares +
capital goods).
Labour Compensation (Firm level): Total labour compensation of a rm. It is the sum of manageial
compensation and non-managerial compensation.
Capital Employed (Firm level): It is total amount of capital employed by a rm sourced from di¤erent
sources.
Raw Material Expenditure (Firm level): Total amount of expenditure incurred by rm on raw materials,
stores and spares.
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Weighted Average - Borrowings, Sept - Nov 2008
Daily Call Money Rates
Figure A.1: Daily Call Money Rates, Sept. 2008 to Nov 2008
Source: RBI Various Publications.
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Figure A.2: Total Credit Disbursement by Di¤erent Types of Banks in Brazil
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4th Quartile
Indian Manufacturing Firms, 2006-2009
Firm-level Exports: Quartiles
Figure A.3: Firm level Exports (Manufacturing): Quartiles, 2006-2009
Notes: Figures represent average real exports (deated by the wholesale price index) over all exporters operating in
the manufacturing sector in a particular year. Quartiles are dened according to the total assets of a rm. If a
rms total asset falls below the 25th percentile of the total assets of the corresponding industry to which the rm
belongs, then the rm belongs to the 1st quartile. Similarly, if a rms asset is within 25th-50th, 50th-75th and over


















































































Total Merchandise Exports by India
Figure A.4: Total Manufacturing Exports of India: Major Destinations, 2006-2009
Notes: EU is European Union. US is the United States of America. These are major trade destinations of India.






Table 14: Summary Statistics: Banking Relationships of Firms
Banking Relationships
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A
Aggregate 5.21 4 4.45 1 38
Panel B: Dividing by Ownership
Public-sector 7.87 6 6.32 1 38
Domestic Private 5.08 4 4.39 1 36
Foreign 5.03 5 2.64 1 16
Panel C: Dividing by Size
1st Quartile 2.27 2 1.49 1 12
2nd Quartile 3.51 3 2.27 1 19
3rd Quartile 5.45 5 2.68 1 18
4th Quartile 9.75 9 5.73 1 38
Panel C: Dividing by Export Orientation
Non-Exporters 3.42 3 2.74 1 20
Exporters 6.07 5 4.83 1 38
Notes: Public-sectorare the govt-owned rms. Domestic Privateare the privately owned rms. Foreignare the
rms of foreign origin. Quartiles (Qri=1;2;3;4) are dened according to the total assets of a rm. A rm belongs to
1st Quartile if the total assets of that rm is h 25th percentile of the total assets of the corresponding industry and
so on.
Table 15: Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Aggregate
Exports 3931.02 241.1 38263.82 0 1026556
Domestic Sales 12489.22 1282.6 74403.75 0.2 3152178
Sales 20352.01 2608.4 110815.9 0.2 3300034
Assets 15454.79 1741.4 91934.69 0.1 2512494
Panel B: Firms Connected to Public-Sector Banks
Exports 3814.799 208.5 38039.25 0 1026556
Domestic Sales 11749.04 1061.4 74347.71 0.2 3152178
Sales 19723.55 2209.7 111818 0.2 3300034
Assets 14628.6 1436.7 90167.8 0.1 2512494
Panel C: Firms Connected to Private Banks
Exports 2995.874 220.4 29988.25 0 1026556
Domestic Sales 10381.23 1150.2 66858.56 0.2 3152178
Sales 16795.94 2450.8 96202.32 0.2 3300034
Assets 13291.51 1645.25 77228.12 0.1 2512494
Panel C: Firms Connected to Foreign Banks
Exports 5653.42 442.6 47947.04 0 1026556
Domestic Sales 19406.68 3327.4 85285.06 0.2 1391784
Sales 27612.48 4952.4 124527.6 0.4 2003998
Assets 22968.41 4031.6 118579.5 0.1 2512494
Notes: Exportsis the total exports of a rm. Domestic Salesis the domestic sales of a rm. Salesis the total
sales (exports plus domestic sales) of a rm. Assetsis the total assets of a rm. Values are expressed in INR
Million.
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